In 1960, the labor force participation of males 60 to 64 years old in Mexico was 94.6 percent; by 2010, it had declined to 65.2 percent. Other Latin American countries are seeing similar trends, as did developed countries before the 1990s. These trends are important because workers' early retirement affects the financial sustainability of social security systems. In this study, we find that the Mexican social security system is not actuarially fair and provides incentives to retire "early"-before age 65. The system's retirement incentives affect retirement behavior and are potentially one of the main factors explaining the decline in male labor force participation.
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Introduction
Mexico has experienced a decline of more than 30 Previous literature indicates that these trends are similar to those experienced in developed countries; they have seen a sharp decline in labor force participation among men of retirement age in the past decades (see for example, Mitchell and Fields, 1982; Costa, 1998; Blöndal and Scarpetta, 1999) . The decline was most apparent in the United
States before the 1990s.
Many studies find that one of the causes for the sustained decline in male labor force participation from the 1970s to the 1990s was the design of social security systems and employer-provided retirement plans that provided incentives for early retirement (for example, Hurd, 1990; Ruhm, 1995 The main findings are that lower income employees have more incentives to opt for early retirement. Higher income individuals prefer to delay retirement up to the normal retirement age (age 65 in Mexico). A worker's social security wealth has a positive impact on the probability of retiring and the incentive measures have a negative impact on retirement; i.e., they encourage delaying retirement. Basically, a negative estimate of the incentive measure indicates that delaying retirement is preferable given that workers' future social security wealth will be greater than in the current period. The estimates of the retirement probability model show that the incentives of the social security system are an important factor in retirement decisions. These results are as we expected and are consistent with the findings in Gruber and Wise (2004) .
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the Mexican social security system. Section 3 describes the methodology we used to build estimates of the incentives to retire every year after the worker becomes age eligible. Section 4 describes the data sets and sample we used in the analysis. Section 5 describes how we estimated workers' social security wealth, what those estimates are, and the estimates of the incentives to retire in the Mexican social security system. Section 6 presents the results of a probability regression model, which includes in the explanatory variables social security wealth and the estimates of the incentives to retire in order to assess the relevance of the incentives or rules of the social security system in retirement decisions in Mexico. Finally, Section 7 presents brief final remarks.
Mexico's Social Security System
Overview
In Mexico, the labor force includes individuals in the formal and informal employment sectors. Workers in the formal sector contribute to the social security system and are entitled to health care services and social security benefits. Contributions to the Mexican Social Security Institute (IMSS) are mandatory for most private sector workers.
Altogether, IMSS covered 32.9 percent of the total labor force in 2010. In 1997, IMSS reformed the pay-as-you-go (PAYG) social security plan and replaced it with a fully funded system of personal retirement accounts (PRA). The "new generation" of workers that entered the labor market after the social security reform can only claim social security benefits under the PRA rules. The "transition generation" are workers that contributed previously to the PAYG and continue to contribute under the new PRA system. When they retire, they can choose to claim social security benefits under either the PAYG or PRA rules, 2 and of course most will choose the plan that pays the highest benefits.
Below we describe in more detail the main paths to retirement in Mexico and other options that could provide incentives for retirement. Normal and early retirement are the main paths for retirement. 3 In contrast to the U.S. social security system, dependent and survivor benefits in Mexico do not provide incentives for couples to make joint retirement decisions. Nevertheless, we describe the design of these benefits. In addition, we discuss incentives to re-enter the labor market after initial retirement and other retirement options through employer-provided or private pensions. 2 Individuals that contributed to the social security system between 1992 and 1997 have in addition pension funds accumulated at SAR, complementary personal retirement accounts introduced in 1992. The 1992 Mexican pension reform is described in more detail in Aguila (2011). However, SAR92 was a complementary personal retirement account that awarded funds as a one-off payment at retirement. The SAR92 system had many operational inconsistencies that led to a major reform in 1997. In this study, we do not consider any incentives provided by SAR92. 3 Some individuals may be eligible to claim benefits from both the U.S. and Mexican social security systems due to the well-documented migration from Mexico to the United States. For return migrants, retirement incentives from the U.S. social security system may affect their retirement decisions. However, there is no social security agreement between Mexico and the United States, so contributions to the Mexican Social Security system would not be taken into account in the U.S. system. Aguila and Zissimopoulos (2011), using the MHAS, find that none of the return migrants from the United States to Mexico receive U.S. and Mexican social security benefits; return migrants either receive benefits from the United States or from Mexico; 4 percent and 19 percent, respectively.
Normal and Early Retirement
Normal retirement age in Mexico is 65. The IMSS system requires at least 10 years of contributions to PAYG and 25 years to PRA. As the PAYG is a defined benefit system, social security benefits are computed as a proportion of the average wage in the five years before retirement. In the PAYG system, the social security benefits increase for each year of contribution over and above the minimum 10-year requirement. PRA social security benefits are computed based on the amount accumulated in the personal account.
The minimum social security benefit guarantee is the minimum wage of Mexico City for the PAYG and PRA. In both cases, social security retirement benefits are indexed to inflation.
Early retirement is from ages 60 to 64 and requires at least 10 years of contribution to the PAYG and 25 years to the PRA systems. In the PAYG, the early retirement social security benefits are reduced by 5 percent for each year below the normal retirement age. For an individual who retires at age 60, social security benefits represent 75 percent of the normal retirement social security benefits. In the PRA, early retirement is not penalized because individuals receive social security benefits according to the amount accumulated in the personal account.
Individuals from the transition generation that do not satisfy the PRA requirements obtain social security benefits under the PAYG rules. We present in Figure 1 the old-age pension replacement rate, i.e. the pension as a proportion of the wage previous to retirement, from age 60 for each level of labor income in number of times the minimum wage. The old-age pension replacement rate measure shows the effectiveness of the pension system in providing income during retirement as it replaces wages prior to retirement. The pension replacement rate is computed assuming 10 years of contributions at age 60. The replacement rate is 100 percent for individuals earning the minimum wage as they receive the minimum pension guarantee. Workers earning the minimum wage have incentives to retire at age 60. However, as labor income increases, the slope is steeper and individuals have more incentives to retire at a later age. The penalty for retiring below the normal retirement age is actuarially equivalent, since the present value of the early retirement social security benefits is equal to social security benefits at age 65. After age 65, social security benefits only increase with additional years of contribution and Mexico has no mandatory retirement age. There are more incentives to continue contributing after age 65 for higher income workers than there are for lower income workers as the replacement rate for additional years of contribution rise with the wage. The incremental increase in social security benefits after age 65 for lowincome workers is not actuarially fair because the worker's contribution in every additional year is higher than the increase in the present value of the social security benefits, i.e. the worker will contribute more than he will receive on retirement.
The replacement rate of the PAYG for the transition generation individuals that satisfy the PRA requirements is shown in Figure 2 . These are workers that satisfy the minimum of 25 years of contributions. They can choose at retirement the social security benefits in the PAYG or the PRA. Workers earning the minimum wage do not have incentives to reach normal retirement, as they will receive the minimum wage as a social security benefit.
Figure 2. Replacement Rate of the PAYG with 25 Years of Contribution by Level of Labor Income in Number of Times the Minimum Wage
Comparing these findings with Figure 1 we can observe that a transition generation worker whose labor income is the minimum wage has only incentives to claim the early retirement benefits just after contributing 10 years to the social security system.
Individuals with a labor income twice the minimum wage or more have higher incentives to reach normal retirement age. In the PRA system, incentives to retire are driven by the amount accumulated in the personal account. 
Dependent Benefits
Mexico's social security benefits system includes dependent benefits. In the United
States, couples are incentivized to make joint retirement decisions because the benefits a retiring worker receives for his/her spouse vary according to the employment status of that spouse. In Mexico, a retiring worker obtains benefits for a spouse whether or not the spouse is still working. Since our study focused on the labor status of men, we can say that when a husband in Mexico retires, he obtains the dependent benefit for his wife, 5 The only exemptions are those individuals in the transition generation who satisfy the minimum of 25 years of contribution, reach the minimum pension guarantee in the PAYG and PRA, and choose to receive benefits under the PRA rules (Aguila, 2011) . The latter would apply for those retiring with the minimum pension guarantee between August 1997 and January 2002 as during this period the PRA social security benefits were adjusted to inflation and PAYG social security benefits were adjusted to the minimum wage of Mexico City. The adjustment in the minimum wage has not kept up with changes in prices. Since February 2002, the PAYG and PRA social security benefits are both adjusted to inflation; thus, workers with a minimum pension guarantee tend to have no preference of one system over another.
equivalent to 15 percent of his social security benefits, independent of the working status of the wife. 
Survivor Benefits
Survivor benefits are available to the widower or widow at the death of his or her spouse if the spouse was working and enrolled in the social security system. Benefits are also awarded to the surviving spouse of a retired worker when the worker dies.
Re-entering the Labor Market
If a worker enrolled in PAYG retires and claims benefits, then begins working again, the PAYG system cancels the benefits until the worker leaves the new job, and the worker continues contributing to the system from the new job. The PRA provides more incentives to work during retirement as social security benefits can be increased every year with the amount accumulated in the PRA from the new job. 7 However, for individuals with the minimum pension guarantee (the minimum flat rate equivalent to the minimum wage of Mexico City) who re-enter the labor market, the social security benefit is suspended until they stop working. Hence, there are no incentives to work again in the private sector for those individuals that have a minimum pension guarantee.
Employer Provided or Private Pensions
Fewer than 10 percent of private firms in Mexico offer a pension system separate from the federal government's PAYG or PRA systems (Hewitt Associates, 2005) . There is no official information on the coverage provided by private pensions; they have been introduced only in the past decades. However, few firms offer them and coverage in terms of the number of workers that receive these benefits is probably minimal. 6 The worker can also claim 10 percent of the pension as dependent benefit for each child under 16 years old. A single worker with no children can obtain 10 percent of the pension for each parent but must be his dependent. The worker can claim an additional benefit of 15 percent of the pension when he has no dependents and spouse. 7 These individuals are exempt from contributions for pensioners' health care services and disability and life insurance.
The Sample Used in this Study
In this study, we use data from the Mexican Health and Aging Study (MHAS), a two- Individuals that transitioned from working to not working around retirement age are 215, from which 45 re-entered the labor market. In 587 cases, individuals continued working through the observed span, so these observations are right censored. Table 1 shows the main characteristics of our sample, which is male workers ages 50 to 69 enrolled in IMSS. The third column shows the descriptive statistics of all males working enrolled to IMSS or other social security institutions or in the informal sector.
Our sample includes individuals working enrolled to IMSS. The fourth column presents the descriptive statistics of males that are not working for the year 2000. We observed small differences between our sample and males not working. It is worth highlighting that our sample group has a higher proportion of males with undergraduate studies or more than those not working. All groups in the three columns report five children on average. The mean number of residents per household in all groups is approximately four, which indicates that older adults cohabit with other family members. Most males live in urban areas. As expected, the majority of workers in the sample are blue-collar workers due to the nature of the private sector.
Framework: Retirement Incentive Measures
We use the option value, peak value, and one-year accrual retirement incentive measures The value function depends on retirement age ) (R , which determines retirement benefits and the date until earnings are received. The individual compares the expected value function of retiring in the first period possible with the highest expected value function of retiring in the future.
, the individual continues working, as the value of retiring is higher in the future. On the contrary, if 0
retires. The value function is evaluated up to 1 − T as there is no mandatory retirement age in Mexico. The option value postpones retirement in the following case: 9 The option value method has some drawbacks in comparison to using a dynamic programming rule. The main difference is that the option value compares the maximum of the expected value functions and dynamic programming uses the expected value of the maximum. As the maximum of the expected values is lower than the expected value of the maximum, the option value method underestimates the value of retiring in the future. The option value indicates higher retirement incentives before the optimal retirement age estimated with a dynamic programming model (Stock and Wise, 1990) .
[ ]
where γ is the risk aversion parameter with an underlying utility function of constant relative risk aversion, and k accounts for the disutility of labor
is the present discounted value of retirement benefits and s y is the present discounted value of after-tax labor income. 10 The option value function is:
The other incentive measures estimated in this study are simplified versions of the option value method. A single-year accrual only compares the value of retiring in period t and . The peak value is similar to the option value but excludes the present discounted value of future labor earnings. The retirement decision only compares the expected discounted present value of a worker's social security wealth if the worker retired today and the maximum wealth in all future periods.
Social Security Wealth
Social security wealth is the present value of an individual worker social security benefits. In order to compute the retirement incentives measures, we first estimate the social security wealth of every worker. The present discounted value of social security wealth is computed as follows: 
Where IT τ is the income tax that is an increasing function of s Y , ss τ is the social security contribution and mw indicates when the worker earns up to the minimum wage with value one and salaries above the minimum wage with value 0. Those workers earning the minimum wage are exempt from paying the income tax, but receive a redistributive subsidy by the government called a salary loan. Additionally, the employer covers a worker's social security contributions. In these cases, before-tax labor income is lower than after-tax wage due to the government subsidy.
The MHAS provides information on after-tax income ) ( s y . In order to compute social security entitlements before-tax labor income ) ( s Y is required. The income tax ) ( IT τ and social security tax ) ( SS τ are deducted from the gross labor income to obtain the after-tax wage. The income tax is a function of before-tax labor income but the social security tax is a function of before-tax labor income plus labor benefits ) (lb . After rearranging terms, before-tax labor income is:
The before-tax wage was approximated with an iterative procedure. According to labor regulations in Mexico, the minimum labor benefits 
Earnings Profiles
The cohort earnings profiles are constructed with the National Urban Employment
Survey (ENEU) from 1988 to 2003. The cohort cells only include individuals enrolled in
IMSS.
12 Earnings history is estimated as follows: 11 In 2001 the monthly minimum wage in Mexico City was equivalent to $110.70 U.S. dollars using an exchange rate of 1 dollar for $11.1 Mexican pesos. 12 Seasonal workers were selected out of the sample because they correspond to the temporary regime of enrollment in IMSS, which was not included in the pension system before the 1997 reform.
adjust past earnings history for each individual. 13 As mentioned in the previous section, pension entitlements are computed with the average wage of the previous five years to retirement. The earliest date earnings are required in order to compute pension entitlements is 1995. In fact, this avoids including earnings before the large macro shock caused by the 1994 economic crisis.
In the 2000 wage variable, 5 percent of the sample has missing observations. We imputed the missing data using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), controlling for age, gender, education, number of children, total household residents, marital status, household ownership, occupation, number of working hours, self-employed/employed status, and job tenure. Future earnings are estimated from 2001 onwards assuming a constant increase in real wages, which is the average increase around retirement age obtained from the cohort wage profiles. The cohort profiles rate of growth around retirement age is very similar in the three levels of education. 
Social Security Wealth and Retirement Incentives Estimates
Workers' social security wealth computations are shown in Table 2 . The retirement incentive measures estimated are presented in Table 3 , Table 4 , and Table 5 . The social security wealth, single-year accrual and peak value measures are in U.S. dollars. The estimates of the option value are measured in utility units so they are not comparable in magnitude to the peak value or single-year accrual. All four tables (Table 2, Table 3 , Table 4 , and Table 5 ) present the percentiles of the distribution of social security wealth and each incentive measure.
Workers' social security wealth has a decreasing rate of growth for the 10th percentile, indicating that lower-income workers would be better off retiring as soon as they fulfill the requirements to obtain a pension. Those workers in the median and 90th
percentile receive higher social security wealth when delaying retirement up to age 65.
The standard deviation shows high variation in social security wealth. 13 Merging cohort profiles by education and quantiles was also considered, but the cells in the upper part of the distribution had a very high variance and the estimations are not accurate. 14 The results of single-year accrual and peak value follow the same tendency. The incentive measures are computed from age 60, the earliest possible age to retire. In Table   3 we observe that the single-year accrual predicts that individuals in the 10th percentile will choose the early retirement option. In contrast, individuals in the 90th percentile and the median would prefer to work until age 65. Mexican National Employment Survey (ENE).
In Table 4 we can observe the results for the peak value. The peak value also predicts that individuals in the 10th percentile would choose to retire as soon as they reach the minimum requirements. Individuals in the 90th percentile exhibit different retirement behavior; the peak value shows that they are more likely to respond to incentives to delay retirement until age 65. It is worth highlighting that the single-year accrual and peak value are the same from age 61 for the 10th percentile. This is consistent with the social security wealth for the 10th percentile in Table 2 , which indicates that the highest amount is always in the current period when compared to all possible future periods. The latter suggests that the system is not actuarially fair. The option value shows positive values for the 10th and 50th percentiles up to age 64 in Table 5 . After 64 years old, the option value is negative. However, in the 10th percentile the positive option values up to age 64 are very small. Those workers in the 90th percentile have positive option values at all possible retirement ages but the estimate shows a decreasing trend. In sum, social security wealth for lower income employees is higher the earlier they retire. In contrast, higher income workers are better off the more they delay retirement. The incentive measures, particularly the single-year accrual and the peak value, indicate early retirement from age 60 to the 10th percentile, and normal retirement from age 65 to the 50th and 90th percentiles of the distribution. The option value predicts normal retirement for the 10th and 50th percentiles.
Retirement Behavior
Empirical Model
This section presents the estimates of the regression analysis that models retirement decisions. The benchmark model estimated is:
Where it R indicates with value 1 when the individual transitions from working to not working. Thus, in period t the individual was not working and in period 1 − t the individual was working. This is a conditional probability model where G is the cumulative distribution function. G is assumed a standard normal, thus the model is estimated with a probit. The information for each individual is pooled from 2000 to 2003.
There are four periods of data for each individual around retirement age. 
Results of the Retirement Probability Modeling
This section describes the results of the retirement probability modeling for each incentive measure. Table 6 Some of the employment and earnings variables are used to compute social security wealth and the incentive measures. Therefore, including them in the retirement probability model may cause identification problems in the coefficients. Table 6 shows the main results including the incentive measures: single-year accrual, peak value and option value. Social security wealth is always statistically significant in the 5 percent level of confidence. The retirement incentive measures are statistically significant in the specification with no control variables and the peak value and option are still significant in the specification including demographic variables. The retirement incentive measures estimates are not statistically significant when included in the regression employment 15 The same specifications were estimated including a term of linear age or age dummies or cohort dummies providing similar results.
characteristics and earnings. The estimates of social security and retirement incentives measures considerably decline when including control variables. occupation (blue-collar, services, farmer, professionals), type of job (employed or self-employed), tenure at firm, tenure at firm squared, labor market experience, labor market experience squared, average wage of the previous five years (AW), AW squared, labor income, labor income squared, interaction between AW and labor income, and interaction between AW squared and labor income squared. Cohorts are defined as born between 1931-1935, 1936-1940, 1941-1945, and 1946-1950 An increase in $1,000,000 of the single-year accrual without changing pension wealth implies a decline by 4.8 percent in the probability to retire. The latter implies that the probability to retire is lower when pension wealth is greater in the following period than in the current period. An increase in $100,000 of the peak value without changing pension wealth implies a decline by 20.4 percent in the probability to retire as indicated in marginal effect of the second column in the specification without control variables.
Hence, the probability to retire decreases when pension wealth in the future is greater than pension wealth in the current period.
The marginal effect of retirement incentive measures is negative even when including demographic and employment characteristics and earnings. The peak value estimate with no control variables is lower than the single-year accrual with the same specification. This may indicate that the next period pension wealth is more important for retirement decisions than pension wealth later in the future. The interpretation of the marginal effect for option value measure is as follows: A rise in 10,000 units decreases the probability to retire by 0.8 percent. The option value marginal effect estimate in the third column with no control variables is -0.0870.
In sum, the social security wealth and incentive measures coefficients are as expected. Social security wealth is always positive, implying a higher probability to retire the greater the pension entitlements. This shows an income effect in the retirement decision. The incentive measures coefficients are negative, indicating that the higher social security retirement benefits are in the future, in contrast to today, the lower the probability to retire in the current period. A substitution effect is present in the retirement decision.
The coefficients of the single-year accrual, peak value, and option value are smaller when employment characteristics and earnings are included. This could suggest that the coefficients of the incentive measures are underestimated as the employment characteristics and earnings may be capturing part of the effect of the social security system.
Concluding Remarks
There is an important decline in labor force participation before normal retirement age (65) in Mexico and in other Latin American countries. This trend is similar to that seen in the United States before the 1990s.
We find that the incentives for retirement built into the social security system are important factors in workers' retirement decisions. According to the incentive measures estimated, lower income workers would always choose the early retirement option.
Higher income individuals delay retirement in order to claim normal retirement age social security benefits. The accrual rate is in most cases negative, implying that the social security system is not actuarially fair. We find a higher probability to retire when workers have higher social security wealth. The incentive measures indicate there is a lower probability to retire today when social security benefits are higher in future periods.
These results are as expected and similar to the findings in Gruber and Wise (2004) .
However, this trend may revert because Mexico has reformed its old Pay-As-YouGo system, and new cohorts that start retiring under the new system of Personal Retirement Accounts may face different retirement incentives.
The following tables show the coefficients for the different specifications in Table 6 including only cohort dummies (Table A. 1), adding other demographic variables (Table   A. 2), and employment characteristics and earnings (Table A. 3). The probability to retire is slightly higher for households with couples in comparison to households with singles.
The variables for number of household residents and U.S. citizenship or residency are not statistically significant. Table A .2 shows that males with more years of schooling have a lower probability to retire. However, the coefficient of years of schooling becomes very small and positive after including occupation characteristics (see Table A .3). This may indicate that occupation could be correlated to years of schooling and is capturing part of the effect. We find a higher probability to retire for individuals that live in urban in comparison to rural areas. The latter could be explained by a higher access to social security in urban areas.
The available variable to capture differences in wealth is home ownership. The coefficient is significant in all the specifications and is positive. Wealthier individuals have a higher probability to retire. Males in blue collar jobs or in service occupations have a lower probability to retire in comparison to males in white-collar jobs. Job tenure, labor market, and earning variables are not significantly different from zero. 
